Friday, August 24, 2007
You Can Get Seven Soldiers to Sign Anything
The editors of The Weekly Standard, ever vigilant in their mission to "support the troops" by parroting whatever the Administration is saying this week, have trotted out seven of their own soldiers to counter the NYT Op-Ed I linked to below. Their argument boils down to this: the guys in the 82nd (who wrote the earlier piece) are in a different part of Baghdad, so they can't see how wonderfully the surge is working. The Weekly Standard's guys trot out the same "attacks are down, political participation is up" mantra that the surge's proponents have been spouting from the beginning.
What they don't seem to get, however, is that there's no earthly reason to believe that the reductions in violence that have been seen are anything other than temporary. They cite Ramadi and the Anbar Province as exemplars of the effectiveness of counter-insurgency strategy and the effectiveness of holding territory:
This is all true, but only in a very limited sense. Take the example of Fallujah, Samarra or Baqubah. These are three cities where U.S. and coalition forces have in the past declared stable, turned over to the local Iraqis, and seen flare up again after we left. Every time we stabilize a place and turn it over to the locals, it goes to hell again. The key to the perceived success in Ramadi is that the Marines have continued to hold it. The "surge" only works when the increased presence remains.
This is the fatal flaw of all of the rosy predictions and spun statistics on the surge: it only works when it ceases to be a "surge" and becomes a permanent occupation. And even then its effectiveness is suspect, but that's a matter for another post.
The Weekly Standard is not, however, in the business of seriously critiquing the argument these soldiers have presented. Nor do they seem to care that one of the most telling critiques from the first piece goes completely unanswered in their riposte.
The soldiers from the 82nd wrote:
It is the question of who or what our Iraqi partners actually support that continues to make this war a lost cause. the examples of Fallujah, Samarra and Baqubah show that the loyalties and alliances we have forged with different groups in this conflict are transient and subject to dissolution at a moment's notice. The Weekly Standard soldiers act as if the gains they have seen must be permanent, when recent history should lead them to conclude that only a fool would believe such a conclusion so early in the operation.
This is just another example in the litany of cynical, self-serving rhetoric cooked up by the masters of war to justify their continued prosecution of a war that has done more to harm America in the long run than any previous conflict.
http://www.forret.com/tools/trackback.asp?title=You Can Get Seven Soldiers to Sign Anything&blog_name=Decline and Fall&url=http://www.declineandfall.net/2007/08/you-can-get-seven-soldiers-to-sign.html
What they don't seem to get, however, is that there's no earthly reason to believe that the reductions in violence that have been seen are anything other than temporary. They cite Ramadi and the Anbar Province as exemplars of the effectiveness of counter-insurgency strategy and the effectiveness of holding territory:
Take Anbar Province. In 2006, al Qaeda controlled the capital of Ramadi and Marine intelligence officers declared the province effectively lost. A leaked Marine Corps report concluded, "the prospects for securing western Anbar province are dim and there is almost nothing the U.S. military can do to improve the political and social situation there."Today Ramadi is peaceful and Anbar no longer a haven for al Qaeda. The tribal awakening that brought about political reconciliation and stability in Ramadi and Anbar primarily resulted from an improved security environment provided by American forces. Americans not only cleared Ramadi, they also held it by occupying over 65 outposts.
This security environment allowed local tribal leaders to stand up to their former al Qaeda occupiers, and now American and Iraqi forces are improving security beyond Anbar in places like Diyala and Babil Provinces.
This is all true, but only in a very limited sense. Take the example of Fallujah, Samarra or Baqubah. These are three cities where U.S. and coalition forces have in the past declared stable, turned over to the local Iraqis, and seen flare up again after we left. Every time we stabilize a place and turn it over to the locals, it goes to hell again. The key to the perceived success in Ramadi is that the Marines have continued to hold it. The "surge" only works when the increased presence remains.
This is the fatal flaw of all of the rosy predictions and spun statistics on the surge: it only works when it ceases to be a "surge" and becomes a permanent occupation. And even then its effectiveness is suspect, but that's a matter for another post.
The Weekly Standard is not, however, in the business of seriously critiquing the argument these soldiers have presented. Nor do they seem to care that one of the most telling critiques from the first piece goes completely unanswered in their riposte.
The soldiers from the 82nd wrote:
However, while creating proxies is essential in winning a counterinsurgency, it requires that the proxies are loyal to the center that we claim to support. Armed Sunni tribes have indeed become effective surrogates, but the enduring question is where their loyalties would lie in our absence. The Iraqi government finds itself working at cross purposes with us on this issue because it is justifiably fearful that Sunni militias will turn on it should the Americans leave.
It is the question of who or what our Iraqi partners actually support that continues to make this war a lost cause. the examples of Fallujah, Samarra and Baqubah show that the loyalties and alliances we have forged with different groups in this conflict are transient and subject to dissolution at a moment's notice. The Weekly Standard soldiers act as if the gains they have seen must be permanent, when recent history should lead them to conclude that only a fool would believe such a conclusion so early in the operation.
This is just another example in the litany of cynical, self-serving rhetoric cooked up by the masters of war to justify their continued prosecution of a war that has done more to harm America in the long run than any previous conflict.
Labels: conservatism, Iraq, politics
