Monday, January 26, 2009
The Problem Is Not In The Field Manual
Valtin at Invictus has written a provocative article arguing that Appendix M of Army Field Manual 2-22.3 “took the standard operating procedure of Camp Delta at Guantanamo Bay and threatened to expand it all over the world.” It’s an argument that is worth reading, but it suffers from a basic misunderstanding of how a prison camp in a war zone actually operates, and what interrogation operations actually entail.
The most important feature of Appendix M to interrogators is the approval procedure (handy flowchart on page 349 of the FM). Essentially, a General has to sign off on it, and throughout the employment of the technique (i.e., the vast majority of the time when the detainee is just sitting by himself in a cell) special safeguards must be employed and the detainee must be monitored. No General wants to be the next Karpinski or Miller, so the consensus view is that given the political climate, separations will be very hard to obtain. I've been out of that business for almost two years now, so I have no way of knowing whether that prediction came true. The dozens of interrogators I knew when the FM was published believed it though.
Valtin then goes into some very loose interpretation of what "Separation" actually entails:
Solitary Confinement: that's what "Separation" essentially means. No argument there. But it's not the same "solitary confinement" that you've seen in the movies. (A comment heard often in U.S.-run Iraqi prisons is how much "easier" they are than American prisons.) Rather, it's a one-man cell with plenty of light and outside noise. It's just too far away from the other prisoners to allow relationships between them to develop. Is it unpleasant? Of course. So is being in the other parts of a prison. Is it cruel or inhumane? Only if it's done without proper care and supervision, which are mandated explicitly in the FM. There may be quibbles yet regarding acceptable durations of separation, but those arguments exist around the edges. The fact is, prisons need to be set up in such a way that the prisoners are controlled to the extent that uprisings, vital information sharing and terrorist, insurgent, or criminal recruitment are made extremely difficult. This then must be balanced against the requirement that prisoners be treated humanely. I assume there are experts on this, so I leave this question to them.
Perceptual or Sensory Deprivation: it's prohibited. Right there in the Appendix, and throughout the rest of the FM. It is illegal to use goggles, earmuffs, or anything else designed to limit the sensory perception of a detainee who has been separated, except as a field expedient (a condition that by definition cannot exist at a long-term detention facility) and then for a maximum of 12 hours. I do not see how an honest reading of could support such a conclusion.
Sleep Deprivation: is made explicitly illegal in Appendix M. Detainees must receive at least 4 hours of uninterrupted sleep per 24-hour period. That doesn't sound like much, but that's the minimum standard for our own fighting forces (cf. FM 22-5, "Combat Stress," Chapter 4). Try telling an MP who just rotated back on shift after four hours of sleep that the prisoners he guards can't be woken up until they get a solid eight and see how he reacts.
The Induction of Fear and Hopelessness: this is a condition of prison life in general, and it is a tool in the interrogator's arsenal, because someone who is afraid and hopeless might (everyone is different) lower his guard and talk. The fear, however, is never to his physical person. Even the old FM was clear on this: if an interrogator is trying to induce fear, it is fear of an unkmnown future, fear for the safety of his family without the breadwinner around to take care of them, fear of a guy like Zarqawi actually taking Iraq over, etc. An interrogator cannot put a detainee in any physical danger, and an interrogator cannot imply that the detainee is in physical danger, for instance by cleaning a pistol on the table between them (weapons are confiscated prior to interrogations anyway). But a broader fear? Yes, it's allowed and yes, it sometimes works. No, the detainee is never made to feel threatened. This is a discussion that could go on for quite a while, so I'll stop here.
The likely use of sensory overload: sensory overload is prohibited explicitly by the phrase, "Care should be taken to protect the detainee from exposure... to Excessive noise." (page M-10) Interrogators have no access to the detainee's cell as per several FMs (part of the strict delineations between MP duties and Interrogator duties), so Valtin's statement that "rather than appear convincing, these caveats seem to direct the interrogation team to just those kinds of procedures that should be used, as long as it is not judged 'excessive'" does not bear scrutiny.
Temperature or environmental manipulation: The same page also explicitly prohibits "temperature or environmental manipulation," although in my experience the only "environmental manipulation" available to interrogator's is what's called the "comfort booth," where the detainee may sit on a cushioned chair, drink tea, watch television, and other heinous practices. Any "environmental manipulation" that violates the "humane treatment" sections littering the pages of this FM is unauthorized by those sections.
Any number of other techniques permitted elsewhere in the AFM, such as "Emotional Pride Down": This gets to a standard misunderstanding about what approaches actually are. Chapter 8 spends a lot of time discussing the ins and outs of approaches, but the key thing to know about them is this: they are always mixed with other approaches. Say an interrogator appeals to a detainee's love for his family. If that detainee is looking at a life in prison, thinking about his family automatically brings up huge anxieties, especially in a culture where being the main breadwinner is an unlikely accomplishment for a now-single mother (the FM might call that a "Love of Family" with "Fear Up Mild." ). It's the combination of the detainee's love for his wife and kids and his understandable fear for their wellbeing that are being used to weaken his resolve. (Notice also that the happiest-sounding and most vicious-sounding approaches are inexorably linked--no one talks because they think their family is swell; they talk because they don't want their family to suffer, and there's no way to show them that link without inducing fear. Take away the fear, and "love of family" is just a trip down memory lane.
The other thing to know is that everyone runs approaches. I used to use this example at the Army Intelligence School when teaching approaches: think about the way you behave when hitting on someone attractive: you smile more, make more eye contact, compliment a bit more, tease a little more, etc., than you would if you weren't hitting on that person. You are trying to get something from that person, and you are controlling your tone to achieve that. If you've ever held a sales job a bell should be going off, because running an approach is a sales pitch. Notice the difference in the way you behave toward bill collectors, salespeople, bartenders, your boss, your children, and anyone else who has the ability to improve or reduce your quality of life. We all run approaches, we just don't call them that. And we run them concurrently with other approaches. So do interrogators, unless they really suck at their jobs.
Why Separation is Necessary
In order to understand what "Separation" means, you should also know a bit about detention facilities in war. I don't know whose law this is, but it has been U.S. policy since the beginning of the war to not build any new structures (presumably to fend off the "colonizer" accusation). Abu Ghraib (the prison where I spent the most time) is unusual in this, since it's a facility that the U.S. appropriated, but even there our detainees lived in hundreds of twelve-man tents separated by chain-link fences. There's no way to keep them from passing information in that environment, especially since the MPs aren't generally Arabic linguists.
Some of that information is resistance training, some of it is the establishment of alibi stories, some of it is recruiting for known terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda in Iraq and Iraqi Hezbollah, and some of it is direct, credible threats to the safety of the family of a detainee who knows too much. That information-sharing has contributed to the deaths of many people, on both sides of the conflict. The worst of it is probably classified, so I won't go into it. There were very few individual cells relative to the population, and most of those were used by the MPs to keep riot instigators away from potential riot instigatees. Yes, Abu Ghraib had all the problems that other prisons have.
Separation is the only method by which detainees with significant information can be prevented from gathering support for their continued silence. Just so we're clear on this, that means that if detainee x knows where, say, car bombs are being built, those car bombs will continue to be produced as long as he successfully resists. From the interrogator's perspective, separation is a way to weaken the will of a true believer without inflicting any real harm.
The task with Separation is to ensure that it is used rarely, safely, and only when truly warranted, which is why a General must personally approve of it and why there are so many references to "humane treatment" in Appendix M. The red tape involved in getting a Separation approved also serves to limit its use. I take a backseat to nobody in condemning torture, cruelty, and demeaning treatment, especially by interrogators and I see nothing in Appendix M itself to warrant such a frenzied reaction.
EPW Status
I do see a problem outside America's laws, however. The Separation approach technique applies only to those accorded EPW status, as defined by the Geneva Convention on Torture:
However, separation may not be employed on detainees covered by Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (GPW), primarily enemy prisoners of war (EPWs) (emphasis in the original).The question of whether an insurgent merits EPW status is the loophole through which the Bush Administration was able to justify its abuse of prisoners—even the term “detainee” is used specifically to avoid referring to people who might not merit inclusion in the ranks of EPWs.
My point is that the Geneva Conventions (GC) are due for an update. The GC were written at a time when war meant one uniformed military, representing a state, fighting against another. Here are the requirements that must be met for a captured person to be declared an EPW:
Alas, this legal argument has some merit, which is what prompted the Pentagon to re-write the Army Field Manual in an attempt to clarify the limits on interrogation techniques no matter who the U.S. is fighting.
If you’re concerned about Appendix M, I suggest working toward an update of the Geneva Convention on Torture to reflect the changed face of combat in the 21st Century. The Army Field Manual is not the problem, the outdated definitions (and only the outdated definitions, in my opinion) of the GC are.
Which isn’t to say that the GC wasn’t violated at Abu Ghraib, Guantanamo Bay and elsewhere. Obviously it was. The use of prison guards to “soften” detainees was a clear violation, which the Army moved swiftly to correct once its nose had been bloodied by the Abu Ghraib pictures. Now, Military Intelligence has no formal authority over Camp Operations. One of the first things new units in interrogation centers do is make friends with the MPs, because those requests for extra blankets, eyeglasses, large-print Qurans, and yes, separation must be implemented by the MP command at their discretion.
There is much to criticize about the Bush Administration's interrogation policies, and much that was obviously illegal. None of the arguments I have put forth here should be taken to endorse waterboarding, hypothermia, sensory deprivation, stress positions or any other overtly cruel and inhumane treatment. FM 2.22-3 should be scrutinized thoroughly, and if my legal arguments are wrong, I'd like to know about it. I have no formal legal training, but I have been through at least 50 training sessions on the Geneva Conventions and Laws of War by JAG Officers, one of whom (himself a former interrogator) declared publicly that he and most of his colleagues would resign their commissions if waterboarding were ever authorized by DoD. This wasn't some random JAG Officer, this was the chief JAG Officer of the Army Intelligence School at the time. There really are good people in the interrogation business.
The worst of the abuses occurred when no one was looking. The authorization of those techniques occurred in what appeared to be a legal black hole (thanks to the inadequacy of the GC). The interrogators who engaged in those abuses were well-trained in the relevant laws and should have known better. They should be prosecuted for obeying unlawful orders at the very least. FM 2-22.3 was written to ensure some oversight of detainee operations and to close some of the loopholes that existed in the previous FM. But the FM is not the problem, nor is Appendix M. The main problem now lies with the Geneva Conventions and with oversight of detention operations in war. The ICRC should have a stronger presence than it has currently.
Valtin's sin was one of over-reaction, which is no great offense. I've always considered the statement, "extremism in the defense of liberty is no vice" to be quintissentially American, despite the source. With Obama in office and still so much attention on the horrors done in our name over the last eight years, this is probably a good time for an independent commission to review FM 2-22.3. As Valtin notes, it was vetted by Alberto Gonzalez's justice department.
http://www.forret.com/tools/trackback.asp?title=The Problem Is Not In The Field Manual&blog_name=Decline and Fall&url=http://www.declineandfall.net/2009/01/problem-is-not-in-field-manual.html
The most important feature of Appendix M to interrogators is the approval procedure (handy flowchart on page 349 of the FM). Essentially, a General has to sign off on it, and throughout the employment of the technique (i.e., the vast majority of the time when the detainee is just sitting by himself in a cell) special safeguards must be employed and the detainee must be monitored. No General wants to be the next Karpinski or Miller, so the consensus view is that given the political climate, separations will be very hard to obtain. I've been out of that business for almost two years now, so I have no way of knowing whether that prediction came true. The dozens of interrogators I knew when the FM was published believed it though.
Valtin then goes into some very loose interpretation of what "Separation" actually entails:
What kind of procedures, which the manual avers cannot be used on regular prisoners of war (who are covered by the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War), make up this special interrogation "technique," separation? In fact, it includes the following: solitary confinement, perceptual or sensory deprivation, sleep deprivation, the induction of fear and hopelessness, and the likely use of sensory overload, temperature or environmental manipulation, and any number of other techniques permitted elsewhere in the AFM, such as "Emotional Pride Down." As at Guantanamo and at prisons in Iraq and Afghanistan, a "multidisciplinary" team implements the program, including a behavioral science consultant (likely a psychologist.I'll address these individually:
Solitary Confinement: that's what "Separation" essentially means. No argument there. But it's not the same "solitary confinement" that you've seen in the movies. (A comment heard often in U.S.-run Iraqi prisons is how much "easier" they are than American prisons.) Rather, it's a one-man cell with plenty of light and outside noise. It's just too far away from the other prisoners to allow relationships between them to develop. Is it unpleasant? Of course. So is being in the other parts of a prison. Is it cruel or inhumane? Only if it's done without proper care and supervision, which are mandated explicitly in the FM. There may be quibbles yet regarding acceptable durations of separation, but those arguments exist around the edges. The fact is, prisons need to be set up in such a way that the prisoners are controlled to the extent that uprisings, vital information sharing and terrorist, insurgent, or criminal recruitment are made extremely difficult. This then must be balanced against the requirement that prisoners be treated humanely. I assume there are experts on this, so I leave this question to them.
Perceptual or Sensory Deprivation: it's prohibited. Right there in the Appendix, and throughout the rest of the FM. It is illegal to use goggles, earmuffs, or anything else designed to limit the sensory perception of a detainee who has been separated, except as a field expedient (a condition that by definition cannot exist at a long-term detention facility) and then for a maximum of 12 hours. I do not see how an honest reading of could support such a conclusion.
Sleep Deprivation: is made explicitly illegal in Appendix M. Detainees must receive at least 4 hours of uninterrupted sleep per 24-hour period. That doesn't sound like much, but that's the minimum standard for our own fighting forces (cf. FM 22-5, "Combat Stress," Chapter 4). Try telling an MP who just rotated back on shift after four hours of sleep that the prisoners he guards can't be woken up until they get a solid eight and see how he reacts.
The Induction of Fear and Hopelessness: this is a condition of prison life in general, and it is a tool in the interrogator's arsenal, because someone who is afraid and hopeless might (everyone is different) lower his guard and talk. The fear, however, is never to his physical person. Even the old FM was clear on this: if an interrogator is trying to induce fear, it is fear of an unkmnown future, fear for the safety of his family without the breadwinner around to take care of them, fear of a guy like Zarqawi actually taking Iraq over, etc. An interrogator cannot put a detainee in any physical danger, and an interrogator cannot imply that the detainee is in physical danger, for instance by cleaning a pistol on the table between them (weapons are confiscated prior to interrogations anyway). But a broader fear? Yes, it's allowed and yes, it sometimes works. No, the detainee is never made to feel threatened. This is a discussion that could go on for quite a while, so I'll stop here.
The likely use of sensory overload: sensory overload is prohibited explicitly by the phrase, "Care should be taken to protect the detainee from exposure... to Excessive noise." (page M-10) Interrogators have no access to the detainee's cell as per several FMs (part of the strict delineations between MP duties and Interrogator duties), so Valtin's statement that "rather than appear convincing, these caveats seem to direct the interrogation team to just those kinds of procedures that should be used, as long as it is not judged 'excessive'" does not bear scrutiny.
Temperature or environmental manipulation: The same page also explicitly prohibits "temperature or environmental manipulation," although in my experience the only "environmental manipulation" available to interrogator's is what's called the "comfort booth," where the detainee may sit on a cushioned chair, drink tea, watch television, and other heinous practices. Any "environmental manipulation" that violates the "humane treatment" sections littering the pages of this FM is unauthorized by those sections.
Any number of other techniques permitted elsewhere in the AFM, such as "Emotional Pride Down": This gets to a standard misunderstanding about what approaches actually are. Chapter 8 spends a lot of time discussing the ins and outs of approaches, but the key thing to know about them is this: they are always mixed with other approaches. Say an interrogator appeals to a detainee's love for his family. If that detainee is looking at a life in prison, thinking about his family automatically brings up huge anxieties, especially in a culture where being the main breadwinner is an unlikely accomplishment for a now-single mother (the FM might call that a "Love of Family" with "Fear Up Mild." ). It's the combination of the detainee's love for his wife and kids and his understandable fear for their wellbeing that are being used to weaken his resolve. (Notice also that the happiest-sounding and most vicious-sounding approaches are inexorably linked--no one talks because they think their family is swell; they talk because they don't want their family to suffer, and there's no way to show them that link without inducing fear. Take away the fear, and "love of family" is just a trip down memory lane.
The other thing to know is that everyone runs approaches. I used to use this example at the Army Intelligence School when teaching approaches: think about the way you behave when hitting on someone attractive: you smile more, make more eye contact, compliment a bit more, tease a little more, etc., than you would if you weren't hitting on that person. You are trying to get something from that person, and you are controlling your tone to achieve that. If you've ever held a sales job a bell should be going off, because running an approach is a sales pitch. Notice the difference in the way you behave toward bill collectors, salespeople, bartenders, your boss, your children, and anyone else who has the ability to improve or reduce your quality of life. We all run approaches, we just don't call them that. And we run them concurrently with other approaches. So do interrogators, unless they really suck at their jobs.
Why Separation is Necessary
In order to understand what "Separation" means, you should also know a bit about detention facilities in war. I don't know whose law this is, but it has been U.S. policy since the beginning of the war to not build any new structures (presumably to fend off the "colonizer" accusation). Abu Ghraib (the prison where I spent the most time) is unusual in this, since it's a facility that the U.S. appropriated, but even there our detainees lived in hundreds of twelve-man tents separated by chain-link fences. There's no way to keep them from passing information in that environment, especially since the MPs aren't generally Arabic linguists.
Some of that information is resistance training, some of it is the establishment of alibi stories, some of it is recruiting for known terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda in Iraq and Iraqi Hezbollah, and some of it is direct, credible threats to the safety of the family of a detainee who knows too much. That information-sharing has contributed to the deaths of many people, on both sides of the conflict. The worst of it is probably classified, so I won't go into it. There were very few individual cells relative to the population, and most of those were used by the MPs to keep riot instigators away from potential riot instigatees. Yes, Abu Ghraib had all the problems that other prisons have.
Separation is the only method by which detainees with significant information can be prevented from gathering support for their continued silence. Just so we're clear on this, that means that if detainee x knows where, say, car bombs are being built, those car bombs will continue to be produced as long as he successfully resists. From the interrogator's perspective, separation is a way to weaken the will of a true believer without inflicting any real harm.
The task with Separation is to ensure that it is used rarely, safely, and only when truly warranted, which is why a General must personally approve of it and why there are so many references to "humane treatment" in Appendix M. The red tape involved in getting a Separation approved also serves to limit its use. I take a backseat to nobody in condemning torture, cruelty, and demeaning treatment, especially by interrogators and I see nothing in Appendix M itself to warrant such a frenzied reaction.
EPW Status
I do see a problem outside America's laws, however. The Separation approach technique applies only to those accorded EPW status, as defined by the Geneva Convention on Torture:
However, separation may not be employed on detainees covered by Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (GPW), primarily enemy prisoners of war (EPWs) (emphasis in the original).The question of whether an insurgent merits EPW status is the loophole through which the Bush Administration was able to justify its abuse of prisoners—even the term “detainee” is used specifically to avoid referring to people who might not merit inclusion in the ranks of EPWs.
My point is that the Geneva Conventions (GC) are due for an update. The GC were written at a time when war meant one uniformed military, representing a state, fighting against another. Here are the requirements that must be met for a captured person to be declared an EPW:
Article 4This argument carries a lot of water in the military. The first thing I heard from fellow interrogators during discussions of abuses at Abu Ghraib and elsewhere was this legal argument. If the detainees don’t meet the definition, they don’t qualify. Hazy concepts like “values” were brushed aside with the ever-popular “Americans are free because people in dark places do dark deeds to keep us free” argument, followed with a derogatory harrumph about my own naivete for bringing up such a wishy-washy objection.
A. Prisoners of war, in the sense of the present Convention, are persons belonging to one of the following categories, who have fallen into the power of the enemy:
1. Members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict as well as members of militias or volunteer corps forming part of such armed forces.
2. Members of other militias and members of other volunteer corps, including those of organized resistance movements, belonging to a Party to the conflict and operating in or outside their own territory, even if this territory is occupied, provided that such militias or volunteer corps, including such organized resistance movements, fulfil the following conditions:
(a) That of being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates;
(b) That of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance;
(c) That of carrying arms openly;
(d) That of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.
3. Members of regular armed forces who profess allegiance to a government or an authority not recognized by the Detaining Power.
4. Persons who accompany the armed forces without actually being members thereof, such as civilian members of military aircraft crews, war correspondents, supply contractors, members of labour units or of services responsible for the welfare of the armed forces, provided that they have received authorization from the armed forces which they accompany, who shall provide them for that purpose with an identity card similar to the annexed model.
5. Members of crews, including masters, pilots and apprentices, of the merchant marine and the crews of civil aircraft of the Parties to the conflict, who do not benefit by more favourable treatment under any other provisions of international law.
6. Inhabitants of a non-occupied territory, who on the approach of the enemy spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading forces, without having had time to form themselves into regular armed units, provided they carry arms openly and respect the laws and customs of war.
B. The following shall likewise be treated as prisoners of war under the present Convention:
1. Persons belonging, or having belonged, to the armed forces of the occupied country, if the occupying Power considers it necessary by reason of such allegiance to intern them, even though it has originally liberated them while hostilities were going on outside the territory it occupies, in particular where such persons have made an unsuccessful attempt to rejoin the armed forces to which they belong and which are engaged in combat, or where they fail to comply with a summons made to them with a view to internment.
2. The persons belonging to one of the categories enumerated in the present Article, who have been received by neutral or non-belligerent Powers on their territory and whom these Powers are required to intern under international law, without prejudice to any more favourable treatment which these Powers may choose to give and with the exception of Articles 8, 10, 15, 30, fifth paragraph, 58-67, 92, 126 and, where diplomatic relations exist between the Parties to the conflict and the neutral or non-belligerent Power concerned, those Articles concerning the Protecting Power. Where such diplomatic relations exist, the Parties to a conflict on whom these persons depend shall be allowed to perform towards them the functions of a Protecting Power as provided in the present Convention, without prejudice to the functions which these Parties normally exercise in conformity with diplomatic and consular usage and treaties.
C. This Article shall in no way affect the status of medical personnel and chaplains as provided for in Article 33 of the present Convention. Clearly, an insurgency meets none of those requirements (they fail number 6 because not carrying arms openly is a defining feature of the insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan). Logic may dictate that if you’re going to declare war on “terror,” then a “terrorist” imprisoned in the War on Terror is the enemy combatant and ought to be treated as such, but there is a ton of wiggle room here. It pains me to write it, but the Bush Administration's interpretation has the narrow legal merit, which I suspect will be their primary defense if prosecutions are pursued.
Alas, this legal argument has some merit, which is what prompted the Pentagon to re-write the Army Field Manual in an attempt to clarify the limits on interrogation techniques no matter who the U.S. is fighting.
If you’re concerned about Appendix M, I suggest working toward an update of the Geneva Convention on Torture to reflect the changed face of combat in the 21st Century. The Army Field Manual is not the problem, the outdated definitions (and only the outdated definitions, in my opinion) of the GC are.
Which isn’t to say that the GC wasn’t violated at Abu Ghraib, Guantanamo Bay and elsewhere. Obviously it was. The use of prison guards to “soften” detainees was a clear violation, which the Army moved swiftly to correct once its nose had been bloodied by the Abu Ghraib pictures. Now, Military Intelligence has no formal authority over Camp Operations. One of the first things new units in interrogation centers do is make friends with the MPs, because those requests for extra blankets, eyeglasses, large-print Qurans, and yes, separation must be implemented by the MP command at their discretion.
There is much to criticize about the Bush Administration's interrogation policies, and much that was obviously illegal. None of the arguments I have put forth here should be taken to endorse waterboarding, hypothermia, sensory deprivation, stress positions or any other overtly cruel and inhumane treatment. FM 2.22-3 should be scrutinized thoroughly, and if my legal arguments are wrong, I'd like to know about it. I have no formal legal training, but I have been through at least 50 training sessions on the Geneva Conventions and Laws of War by JAG Officers, one of whom (himself a former interrogator) declared publicly that he and most of his colleagues would resign their commissions if waterboarding were ever authorized by DoD. This wasn't some random JAG Officer, this was the chief JAG Officer of the Army Intelligence School at the time. There really are good people in the interrogation business.
The worst of the abuses occurred when no one was looking. The authorization of those techniques occurred in what appeared to be a legal black hole (thanks to the inadequacy of the GC). The interrogators who engaged in those abuses were well-trained in the relevant laws and should have known better. They should be prosecuted for obeying unlawful orders at the very least. FM 2-22.3 was written to ensure some oversight of detainee operations and to close some of the loopholes that existed in the previous FM. But the FM is not the problem, nor is Appendix M. The main problem now lies with the Geneva Conventions and with oversight of detention operations in war. The ICRC should have a stronger presence than it has currently.
Valtin's sin was one of over-reaction, which is no great offense. I've always considered the statement, "extremism in the defense of liberty is no vice" to be quintissentially American, despite the source. With Obama in office and still so much attention on the horrors done in our name over the last eight years, this is probably a good time for an independent commission to review FM 2-22.3. As Valtin notes, it was vetted by Alberto Gonzalez's justice department.
Labels: GWOT, interrogation, Iraq, prison, terrorism, torture
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